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Analyst Monitoring and Earnings Management:  
The Roles of Corporate Disclosure and National Culture 
 
 
 Abstract 
We examine country-level determinants of private information search incentives, and whether 
analysts’ role in constraining managers’ opportunistic earnings management varies across 
countries. In a sample of 31,312 firm-year observations originating from 30 countries, we 
document that: (1) analyst coverage is negatively (positively) related to the level of corporate 
disclosure (how secretive the national culture is); (2) the negative association between analyst 
coverage and earnings management is observed in stronger investor protection countries but not 
in weaker investor protection countries; and (3) analyst monitoring fails to mitigate culture-
driven earnings manipulations in countries with more individualistic and uncertainty-tolerant 
cultures. Taken together, financial analysts’ role in constraining opportunistic earnings 
management across countries appears to vary with corporate disclosure and cultural 
environments.    
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we examine country-level determinants of investors’ private information 
search incentives (proxied by analyst coverage) and ask whether financial analysts play a 
monitoring role to curb earnings management practice across countries. Prior literature suggests 
that country-level institutions and cultural factors have siginficant capital market consequences 
(e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Hope 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2007; Han, 
Kang, Salter, and Yoo 2008). However, there is a paucity of evidence on country-level 
determinants of private information search incentives and how analysts’ monitoring roles vary 
across countries with different investor protection and culture.  
Corporate disclosure levels capture the amount of disclosed information, while the 
secretiveness of national culture reflects the likelihood of withholding releavnt information. In 
stronger disclosure environments and less secretive cultures, where corporate disclosure levels 
tend to be higher (hence there is more information to process), it is possible that the demand for 
information intermediaries is higher than that for information providers. In contrast, in weaker 
disclosure environments and more secretive cultures, the demand for information production is 
likely to be higher than that for information processing. As a result, financial analysts are more 
likely to play the role of information provider rather than information intermediary in order to 
complement the weaker corporate disclosure. Hence, we hypothesize and test whether financial 
analysts’ information search levels vary across countries that have different disclosure and 
cultural environments, depending on whether their primary role in the capital market is 
information intermediary or information provider.  
Our cross-country setting provides a greater power to reject the null hypothesis of 
analysts role as an information provider than in a single country setting (e.g., Lang and 
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Lundholm 1996), as the variation in disclosure levels and culture across countries is likely to be 
greater than the variations in one jurisdiction, e.g., the U.S. In this regard, our tests complements 
the single country evidence from Lang and Lundholm (1996), who did not provide support for 
the role of financial analysts as information provider.1  
Next, we hypothesize and test whether the monitoring role of analysts vary across 
countries by focusing on their role in constraining managers’ opportunistic earnings management 
behaviors. Using U.S. data, Yu (2008) finds that analysts play a governing role in corporations, 
resulting in a negative relation between analyst coverage and earnings management. However, 
given international variations in investor protection and culture that are known to influence 
managers’ decision to manipulate earnings (Leuz et al. 2003; Han et al. 2008), it is not clear 
whether the association between analyst coverage and earnings management will generalize to 
countries other than the U.S.  Hence we ask whether financial analysts mitigate both legal 
institution- and culture-driven earnings management incentives across countries.2  
Our evidence shows the following. First, we find that analyst coverage is on average 
lower in stronger disclosure regimes and in less secretive cultures. These suggest, consistent with 
our prediction, that private information search incentives are greater in weaker disclosure 
environments and in more secretive cultures. These results supplement Lang and Lundholm’s 
(1996) U.S. evidence on the information intermediary role of analysts by documenting 
information provider role of analysts in countries with weaker disclosure rules and more 
secretive culture. Second, our results show that analysts constrain earnings management in strong 
investor protection countries, consistent with the monitoring view of analysts, but earnings 
                                                 
1 Their evidence supports the information intermediary role of analysts.   
2 For example, Leuz et al. (2003), firms manage earning less in stronger investor protection countries. Han et al. 
(2008) document that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is greater in countries with more individualistic and 
uncertainy-tolerant culture, suggesting that national culture matters in managers’ decision to manipulate earnings. 
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magement increases with analyst coverage in weaker investor protection countries, in line with 
the idea that analysts can put pressure to report better firm performance when there isn’t 
appropriate incentives to monitor. These results suggest that financial analysts’ monitoring 
incentives vary with the strength of investor protection. Finally, our evidence shows that analysts 
induce more earnings management, instead of mitigating it, in more individualistic and 
uncertainty-tolerant cultures.   
This study contributes to the literature on financial analysts’ information search and 
monitoring incentives in the following ways. First, our evidence shows that the main role 
financial analysts play in a capital market (i.e., information intermediary or information 
provider) depends on the corporate disclosure level and the likelihood of managers’ withholding 
information in the economy. This finding complements Lang and Lundholm’s (1996) earlier U.S. 
evidence on financial analysts role as informatio intermediary (but not as information provider). 
Second, we find that national culture relates to analysts’ information search and that analyst role 
in constraining earnings management is conditional on the cultural environment (i.e., how 
secretive the culture is). We document that analysts’ information search incentives are higher in 
more “secretive” cultures, but that they fail to mitigate culture-driven earnings management in 
more individualistic and uncertainty-tolerant cultures. Finally, we provide evidence which 
suggests that analysts’ monitoring incentives vary with the legal environment (i.e., investor 
protection mechanisms): analysts appear to monitor managers when investor protection is strong, 
but not in the absence of appropriate legal incentives, i.e., in weak investor protection 
environments.      
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review 
relevant literature and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe our methodology and 
sample. In Section 4, we discuss the results. In Section 5, we conclude. 
 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
Financial analysts collect and analyze information about the firms they follow, 
monitoring managers by reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Healy and Palepu 2001; Frankel and Li 2004; Dyck 2006). Lang and 
Lundholm’s (1996) U.S. evidence suggests that analysts respond to firms’ disclosure practices, 
i.e., firms can attract analysts, reduce information asymmetries and limit market surprises by 
adopting more forthcoming disclosure practices. Prior literature identifies two possible roles of 
financial analysts in the capital market – the roles of information intermediary and information 
provider (e.g., Bhushan 1989). In the Bhushan’s model (1989), the effect of increased disclosure 
on the demand for analyst services depends on the role that analyst play in the capital market.3 If 
analysts are primarily information intermediaries – the principal flow of information goes from 
the firm to the analysts, who process the information and trasmit it to the capital market – then an 
increase disclosure means the analyst has a more valuable report to sell, increasing aggregate 
demand for analyst services. However, if analysts are primarily information providers who 
compete with firm-provided disclosures made directly to investors, then an increase in corporate 
disclosure will substitute for the analysts report, decreasing aggregate demand for analyst 
services. Lang and Lundholm’s (1996) U.S. evidence shows that corporate disclosure and 
                                                 
3 On the supply side, more disclosure will increase aggregate supply of analyst services if it is less costly to receive 
information from the firm than to acquire it independently from other sources. 
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number of analyst following are positively associated, consistent with the information 
intermediary role of analysts. 
In fact, it is possible that analysts’ role in the capital market might vary across countries. 
Even though analysts primarily act as information intermediaries in stronger disclosure 
environments, where firms disclose more and hence analysts have more information to process, 
in weak disclosure regimes, where firms do not provide sufficient information through public 
disclosure, analysts might engage in information production in order to supplement poor 
corporate disclosure. Taken together, we predict that analysts play more of an information 
provider (intermediary) role in weaker (stronger) disclosure environments. This leads us to the 
following hyopthesis: 
 
H1: Analyst coverage is negatively associated with corporate disclosure levels 
 
In general, research in comparative accounting has produced an awareness of important 
basic differences in accounting practices in different countries, which are related with the 
influence of various environmental factors such as national culture (e.g., Radebaugh 1975; Gray 
1988; Radebaugh, Gray, and Black 2006). For our investigation, it is possible that cultural 
tendency to be secretive relate to analysts information search incentives. Gray (1988) describes 
the secrecy dimension of accounting subculture values as “a preference for confidentiality and 
the restriction of disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely 
involved with its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open, and 
publicly accountable approach.” To the extent that managers have greater tendency to withhold 
information in more secretive cultures, ceteris paribus, corporate disclosure levels would be 
lower and hence private information search incentives would be higher.  
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Our investigation extends prior studies that document an association between national 
culture and corporate disclosure levels (e.g., Salter and Niswander 1995; Jaggi and Low 2000; 
Hope 2003) by examining how the cultural tendency to be secretive relates to financial analysts’ 
private information search incentives. The secrecy hypothesis predicts that managers in more 
secretive culture have a greater tendency to withhold information, rather than disclose it, ceteris 
paribus. Thus, to the extent that the information environments are weaker in more secretive 
cultures, the demand for information production might be higher. If analysts, responding to such 
demand, assume the role of information provider in those countries, analyst coverage will relate 
positively to how secretive the culture is. This reasoning leads us to the following prediction: 
 
H2: Analyst coverage is positively related to the cultural tendency to be secretive 
 
In theory, the association between analyst coverage and earnings management can be 
either positive (the “pressuring” view) or negative (the “monitoring” view). The monitoring view 
suggests that financial analysts who have financial expertise track corporate financial statements 
on a regular basis are likely to act as external monitors of managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 
1976, Healy and Palepu 2001).4 The pressuring view suggests that analyst coverage is often held 
responsible for creating excessive pressure on managers to manage earnings. Firms that miss 
analyst forecasts usually suffer significant declines in their stock price. In practice, one of the 
primary earnings targets that managers try to achieve is to meet analysts’ forecast consensus (e.g. 
DeGeorge et al. 1999).5,6   
                                                 
4 As Yu (2008) notes, they tend to interact directly with management and raise questions on different aspects of 
earnings numbers through earnings release conferences. For example, it is known that financial analysts are directly 
involved in the discovery of corporate fraud in companies including Compaq, CVS, Electronic Data System, 
Gateway, Motorola, etc. (e.g., Dyck 2006).  
5 Yu’s U.S. evidence (2008) supports the monitoring hypothesis, indicating less earnings management as analyst 
coverage increases. However, it is not clear if this finding generalizes to countries outside the U.S, as there is little 
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Prior literature shows that managers’ earnings management behaviors vary 
internationally with legal institutions and culture (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Han et al. 2008). Leuz et 
al. (2003) argue that strong and well-enforced outsider rights limit insiders’ acquisition of private 
control benefits, and consequently, mitigate insiders’ incentives to manage accounting earnings 
because they have little to conceal from outsiders. Their evidence shows that earnings 
mangement is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection of outside investors is weak, 
because in these countries insiders enjoy greater private control benefits and hence have stronger 
incentives to obfuscate firm performance. Han et al. (2008) find that managers engage in 
opportunistic earnings management more in countries with more individualistic and uncertainy-
tolerant culture. 
 A priori, it is not clear whether the monitoring role of analysts would vary with the 
strength of legal environments. On the one hand, it is possible that analysts play a greater 
monitoring role in stronger legal environments (i.e., stronger investor protection mechanisms 
including outsider rights) by constraining opportunistic earnings management as analysts in 
those environments, where financial markets tend to be more developed and competitive, are 
likely to be more competent and hence better equipped to monitor managers.7,8 Thus, it is 
possible that financial analysts in stronger legal environments are more effective in constraining 
opportunistic earnings management given their superior ability (e.g., financial expertise) to 
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence on whether analysts’ monitoring roles vary across countries that have different disclosure and cultural 
environments. 
6 Prior studies document that external auditors play different governance role internationally (e.g., Fan and Wong 
2005; Choi and Wong 2007; Francis and Wang 2008), suggesting that firm stakeholders’ monitoring incentives 
relate to country-level factors. The evidence on the differing monitoring role of auditors across countries provides 
little guidance for analysts’ case for the following reason: while auditors face  litigation risk from their audit reports 
and the risk varies across countries, analysts do not have such concerns. Hence, there is little reason to expect that 
analyst coverage relate systematically to the difference in litigation risks across countries. 
7 Our maintained assumption is that financial analysts provide monitoring regardless of whether their main role is 
information intermediary or information provider. 
8 In line with this idea, Hope (2003) finds that financial analysts demonstrate better earnings forecasting 
performance in countries with more effective legal enforcement. 
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monitor managers. On the other, the demand for corporate monitoring in general might be 
greater in weak legal environments, where managers are more likely to accumulate private 
control benefits in weak legal environments and obfuscate the firm performance (e.g., Leuz et al. 
2003).9 Since the direction of association is not obvious ex-ante, we develop the next hypothesis 
as non-directional in the following manner:   
 
H3: The association between analyst coverage and earnings management will vary with the 
legal environment (i.e., countries with stronger investor protection and outsider rights). 
 
 
 Next, we investigate whether the role financial analysts play in constraining earnings 
management varies with culture. On the one hand, it is possible that analysts in more secretive 
cultures, where the demand for monitoring to reduce information asymmetry is greater, provide 
closer monitoring. On the other, analysts in more secretive cultures might provide less effective 
monitoring if they cannot overcome managers’ cultural tendency to be secretive, i.e., withhold 
relevant information and increase firm opacity. Taken together, how effective analysts will be in 
reducing earnings management in more secretive culture is an empirical question. As the 
direction of association is not clear ex-ante, we develop our next hypothesis as follows:     
 
H4: The association between analyst coverage and earnings management will vary with 
national culture (i.e., how secretive the culture is). 
 
 
3.  Research Design and Sample Selection 
3.1.  Research Design 
                                                 
9 In either case, analysts also have incentives to go along with earnings management behavior, driven by the need to 
pursue investment banking business, the need to maintain good relationship with management for access to private 
information, and the need to avoid downgrades in stocks in which major clients have significant holdings (e.g., 
Dechow et al. 2000, Lin and McNichols 1998, Michaely and Womack 1999). These incentives might override the 
monitoring incentives especially in weak legal environments where legal enforcement is weaker (e.g., Francis, 
Khurana and Pereira 2003, Francis and Wong 2007). 
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Prior studies show that the choice of analyst following depends on unobserved or partly 
observed characteristics such as firm size, risk, analysts’ incentives (e.g., Yu 2008). We adopt 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to avoid this endogeneity problem. We run the 
following regression models in the first stage (Eq.1) and run the second stage regression using 
the fitted values from the first stage regression (Eq.2). 
Coverage = β0 + β1DISREQ + β2SEC + β3LNSIZE + β4LOSS + β5ISSUE  
+ β6ROA + β7RECORR + β8ROESTD + ε 
(1) 
    
EM = α0 + α1 Coverage + α2 INVPRO + α3 INVPRO×Coverage + 
α4OSRIGHTS + α5OSRIGHT×Coverage + α6CUL + 
α7CUL×Coverage + α8LNSIZE + α9LNBM + α10LEV + 
α11ISSUE + α12ROA + ε 
(2) 
 
Where: 
Coverage =  Analyst coverage at fiscal year-end month 
EM  = Earnings discretion measured by absolute discretionary accruals (|DACC|) 
DISREQ = Disclosure requirement index (La Porta et al. 2006) 
SEC =  Cultural secrecy measure, which is the sum of Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance and 
power distance less individualism score (Hope, Kang, Thomas and Yoo 2008)  
LNSIZE   = Natural logarithm of total assets 
LOSS   = Indicator variable for a loss 
ISSUE  = Indicator variable for equity issuance 
ROA  = Return on Assets 
RECORR = Correlation between firm return and market return (Bhushan 1989) 
ROESTD = Standard deviation of Return on Equity 
INVPRO  = Investor protection index, which is the sum of La Porta et al.’s (1998) rule of law, 
Judicial efficiency, and corruption scores (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003) 
OSRIGHT = Outside shareholder right index (La Porta et al. 1998) 
CUL   = Hofstede (1980) individualism scores less uncertainty avoidance scores  
(Han, Kang, Salter, and Yoo 2008) 
LNBM  =  Natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio 
LEV  = Leverage ratio 
  
Analyst coverage is measured by the number of analysts following at fiscal year-end 
month. Earnings discretion (EM) is the earnings quality measure derived by country-year cross-
sectional regression of modified Jones model following Tucker and Zarowin (2006). EM is 
measured by the absolute value of the predictive error (residual). We differentiate the 
10 
discretionary accruals from total accruals by using the cross-sectional modified Jones model as 
follows: 
ttttt ROAvGPPETAcc εγγγγ ++Δ++= 4321 Re   
where TAcct is the total accruals during year t; GPPEt is the gross property, plant, and equipment 
at the end of year t; ΔRevt is the change of revenue during year t; ROAt is the return on asset 
during year t; all of those, including the constant term, are scaled by total assets at the beginning 
of year t. ε is the error term. We estimate the cross-sectional modified Jones model year by year 
separately within each country. The residuals from the regressions are used as a proxy for the 
discretionary accruals.  
Our measures for disclosure level, investor protection, and shareholder rights of a country are 
from La Porta et al. (1998, 2006). The level of disclosure variable (DISREQ) is from La Porta et 
al. (2006). They construct disclosure index using the five indexes measuring the level of required 
disclosure such as (1) prospectus; (2) compensations; (3) shareholders; (4) inside ownership; (5) 
contracts irregular. The range for this index is from 0 to 1. Investor protection variable (INVPRO) 
is measured as the sum of three legal enforcement variables from La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the 
efficiency of the judicial systems; (2) an assessment of the rule of law; (3) the corruption index. 
The first two variables pertain to proper law enforcement and the last deals with the 
government’s stance toward business. Outside shareholder right variable (OSRIGHT) is 
constructed using anti-director right allowed in a country.10 The range for the index is from zero 
to five. Those measures for investor protection have been used in many prior studies (e.g., Leuz 
                                                 
10 This index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders=Meeting; (3) cumulative 
voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
Extraordinary Shareholders= Meeting is less than or equal to ten percent (the sample median); or (6) when 
shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders meeting. 
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et al., 2003). Finally, we use two culture related measures, SEC and CUL. Following Hope et al. 
(2008), we construct secrecy variable (SEC) using the three operationalized dimensions of 
national culture developed by Hofstede (1980) such as uncertainty avoidance (UA), power 
distance (PD), and individualism (IND). Following Han et al. (2008), we construct culture (CUL) 
variable using the two main cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance (UA) and individualism 
(IND). The variables are measured as follows: 
SEC = UA + PD – IND 
CUL = UA - IND 
The literature on analyst coverage and earnings management is large, which provide us 
with extensive guidance on what variables to include in the models as controls (e.g., Bhushan 
1989; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Yu 2008). In Eq.1, we use control variables considered to be 
associated with analyst coverage. The natural logarithm of total assets (LNSIZE) is included 
because the aggregate demand for analysts’ service is likely to increase as the firm size increases. 
A firm’s profitability related measures such as Return on Assets (ROA), a loss dummy (LOSS), 
standard deviation of Return on Equity (ROESTD) and financing activity related measure 
(ISSUE) are included because analyst provided information is more valuable when their 
variability of its profitability and financing activities are increasing (Bhushan 1989). The 
correlation between firm return and market return is included since marginal information 
acquisition cost for a firm will be high if the firm’s return is not associated with market returns 
and, thus, the demand for analyst’ provided information will be higher (Bhushan 1989). 
We use the following control variables in Eq.2. The natural logarithm of total assets 
(LNSIZE) is included because large firms tend to exercise less discretion as they are subject to 
continuous stock market monitoring. We control for the natural logarithm of book-to-market 
12 
ratio (LNBM) because it is one of the major risk factors identified in prior finance studies (e.g. 
Fama and French, 1993) and risky firms possess greater incentive to exercise discretion in 
reported earnings due to the high variability of earnings. The leverage ratio (LEV) and a dummy 
variable of stock issuance (ISSUE) are included because firms that are likely to raise capital more 
often have incentives to manage earnings opportunistically. Finally, we control the return on 
assets (ROA) since it is expected to be related to managers’ incentive to exercise discretion. 
 
3.2.  Sample Selection 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of firms from 30 countries from 1992 to 
2006. We extract accounting data from COMPUSTAT North America (U.S. firms) and 
COMPUSTAT Global (non-U.S. firms); stock price, analysts’ earnings forecasts, and industry 
identification code from I/B/E/S (all firms); and stock returns from CRSP (U.S. firms). We also 
use the exchange rate data from IMF International Financial Statistics. In September of each 
year,11 we select firm-years that satisfy the following criteria: (1) analysts’ earnings forecasts 
available in I/B/E/S, (2) non-financial firm, (3) financial statement data available from 
COMPUSTAT North America or COMPUSTAT Global, (4) stock price, industry identification 
code and number of shares data available from I/B/E/S, and (5) consistency of currency codes 
between COMPUSTAT Global and I/B/E/S, and between adjacent years. In addition, the 
country-level investor protection variable should be available from La Porta et al. (1998, 2006).  
This process yields a final sample of 31,561 firm-year observations (6,087 distinct firms) 
from 30 countries.12 Given some of our conditioning variables, i.e., legal environment and 
                                                 
11 This criterion follows Frankel and Lee (1999). 
12 We adjust all per share numbers for stock splits and stock dividends using I/B/E/S adjustment factors.  Also, when 
I/B/E/S indicates that the consensus forecast for that firm-year is on a fully diluted basis, we use I/B/E/S dilution 
factors to convert those numbers to a primary basis.  Furthermore, in order to mitigate the effects of outliers, we 
13 
culture variables, are country-level variables, we collapse the sample into to 5,572 country-year-
industry observations. Doing so alleviates the concern that the coefficients are biased towards 
observations from more heavily represented countries, as this appproach does not give undue 
weight to large countries with many firm-year observations. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results and Discussions 
4.1.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Firm level and Country level Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 and Table 2, 
respectively. Table 1 shows that the average (median) number of analysts is 7.9 (6.0) and EM has 
a mean (median) of 0.053 (0.039), which are comparable to those reported in prior studies (e.g., 
Han et al. 2008). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 provides country-level averages of treatement variables. The mean of disclosure 
level (DISREQ) is 0.68. DISREQ is higher in the United States and Singapore and lower in 
Austria, Belgium, and Portugal. The mean of investor protection (INVPRO) and shareholder 
rights (OSRIGHT) are 23.54 and 2.72, repectively. INVPRO is higher in european countries such 
as Denmark, Finland, and Sweden and lower in asian countries such as Indonesia, Philippines, 
and Pakistan, while OSRIGHT is highest in the United States and lower in countries like Belgium 
and Italy.  In addtion, the mean of secrecy (SEC) and culture (CUL)  is 56.38 and -4.93, 
respectively. Countries like Portugal and South Korea are highly secretive and Denmark and U.K 
                                                                                                                                                             
winsorize LNSIZE, LNBM, EM at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Other variables are categorical in nature and do not 
exhibit extreme observations. 
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are less secretive. The mean of another culture related variable, CUL, is -4.93 and higher in UK 
and Denmark, and lower in South Korea and Chile. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Pearson correlations among selected variables are reported separately for the 1st stage and 
2nd stage regression samples in Table 3. Coverage is negatively associated with disclosure level 
(DISREQ) but is positively related to SEC (0.1262, p < 0.05) in the first stage. Note that DISREQ 
is negatively associated with SEC (-0.1073, p < 0.01), which confirms that secretive countries 
disclose less, on average, and analyst supplement the corporate disclosure when disclosure 
practice is more secretive. In the second stage, earnings discretion (DACC) is negatively related 
to INVPRO (-0.0901, p < 0.01) but is not significantly associated with OSRIGHT and CUL. 
Considering the positive relations between INVPRO and OSRIGHT and CUL, however, these 
correlation results should be interpreted with caution because they do not control for differences 
in other firm characteristics in the cross-section. This will be dealt with in the multiple regression 
analysis below. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2.  Multiple Regression Analysis 
Table 4 provides a test of the ability of disclosure level and analyst coverage to explain 
the magnitude of earnings discretion. More specifically, we test whether disclosure level affects 
analysts’ coverage decisions and how the number of analyst following (Coverage) is associated 
with earnings management after controlling for the endogenous nature of analyst coverage 
decision.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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The results for the overall association between analyst following (Coverage) and 
disclosure level (DISREQ) and between Coverage and earnings discretion (EM) are presented in 
Table 4 and Table 5. First two columns show the results of 2-stage least square (2 SLS) 
regressions and the next two columns are estimation results from the 3-stage least square (3 SLS) 
regressions.13 The first stage regression result shows that the coefficient on DISREQ is 
significantly negative in both 2 SLS (-2.5580, t-value = -7.11) and 3 SLS model (-3.7449, t-value 
= -10.67). This finding provides evidence that, consistent with substitution effect argument, 
analysts supplement the corporate disclosure when public information does not provide sufficient 
information. As for secrecy, we find the coefficient on SEC is significantly positive at the 1 
percent level in both 2 SLS (0.0128, t-value = 9.34) and 3 SLS model (0.0139, t-value = 10.76). 
This suggest that more secretive firms are likely to have more analyst followings because 
analysts are likely to have more valuable reports to sell in that environment, which is consistent 
with H2. Overall, in the first stage – analyst coverage determinants model, we confirm our 
conjecture that disclosure and cultural environments are one of the significant determinants in 
analyst coverage decision. 
Next, we examine whether institutional factors like investor production and culture affect 
analysts’ ability to monitor managers. First, we test whether analyst play an important role in 
monitoring managers. As shown in Table 4, we find that, consistent with the monitoring view, 
the coefficient on Coverage is negative in the second stage regressions. In Table 5, we include 
the interaction terms between Coverage and INVPRO, SORIGHT, and CUL to test whether the 
association between EM and Coverage varies with investor protection and culture of the firm’s 
                                                 
13 Three-stage least squares regressions differ from two-stage least squares regressions as they make use of the 
covariance matrix computed from the two disturbance terms in the simultaneous equations framework. Three-stage 
least squares capture cross-equation effects as error terms of individual equations in the system of equations (i.e., 
Eq.1 and Eq.2) are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated. In this regard, three-stage least squares combine 
the features of both two-stage least squares and seemingly unrelated regression. 
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country of domicile. In both two-stage and three-stage models, the interaction terms Coverage × 
INVPRO (Coverage × OSRIGHT) is positive and significant (coef. = 0.0013 (0.0026) in the two-
stage model and coef. = 0.0026 (0.0019) in the three-stage model), indicating that analysts’ 
monitoring role is more effective in countries with high investor protection where disclosure 
levels tend to be higher than those with low investor protection. It suggests that analysts’ role as 
a monitoring mechanism becomes more important when the country-level institution to ensure 
transparent corporate disclosure is stronger. This result is consistent with Francis and Wang 
(2008)’s finding that auditors play a bigger role in constraining earnings discretion in strong 
legal environments than in weak legal environments. As for the cultural factor, we find that the 
coefficients on the the interaction terms Coverage × CUL is significantly negative in both 2 SLS 
(coef. = -0.0002, t-value = -3.52) and 3 SLS models (coef. = -0.0001, t-value = -2.56) at the 1 
percent level. This finding suggests that analysts’ role as a monitoring mechanism constraining 
the usage of earnings discretion is more important when the national culture is more secretive. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the effect of analysts’ monitoring on earnings 
discretion is conditional on national culture and institutional factors like the degree of investor 
protection, suggesting that future research that investigates the monitoring role of analysts in an 
international sample should control for effects of corporate disclosure and cultural factors in the 
research design.  
4.4.  Sensitivity Tests 
Barth, Kaznik and McNichols (2001) and Song, Lobo and Stanford (2006) suggest that 
analyst coverage might be a function of disclosure quality. This suggests that the direction of 
causality might actually run from disclosure quality to analyst coverage rather than from analyst 
coverage to restraining earnings management. To address this issue, we model analyst coverage 
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as a function of also total accounting accruals (deflated by total asset) in the first stage regression, 
and estimate the two equations using the seemingly unrelated regression method as the error 
terms in the two regressions are likely to be correlated with each other. As predicted, the accrual 
variable is significant in the first stage model (p<0.01, two-tailed). However, untabulated results 
show that the second stage model (i.e., earnings management model) results are not affected by 
this control (i.e., the interaction term between analyst coverage and investor protection stays 
significant with a t-statistic of 3.02), suggesting that the potential reverse causality between 
analyst coverage and earnings management does not affect our inference. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 This study addresses two important questions: whether financial analysts play the role of 
information provider and whether their role in constraing managers’ opportunistic reporting 
behaviors is conditional on the legal environments. Regarding the first issue, we find that there is 
a negative association between analyst coverage and country-level disclosure environment, 
suggesting that the demand for analyst service is higher when the mandatory disclosure 
requirements are less stringent. This finding contrasts that of Lang and Lundholm’s (1996) U.S. 
evidence, which suggests that financial analysts’ primary role in a capital market is that of  
information intermediary. 
Our evidence further suggests that analyst coverage associates negatively with earnings 
management in both strong and weak legal enviornments but that the association is stronger in 
strong legal environments. This suggests that while analysts play a governing role across 
countries, they play a greater role in stronger investor protection countries with strong legal 
infrastructures, where financial statement information is more relevant to users’ decisions than in 
18 
countries with weak legal infrastructure (e.g., Ball 2001). This study contributes to the literature 
by documenting that analysts’ governance role varies across countries with the strength of legal 
environment: we find that the extent to which Yu’s (2008) finding generalizes to countries 
outside U.S. varies with how strong the legal environment is.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev 
COVERAGE 7.900 4.000 6.000 10.000 5.931 
DACC 0.053 0.022 0.039 0.066 0.054 
LNSIZE 5.673 4.778 5.656 6.544 1.389 
LOSS 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.267 
ISSUE 0.377 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.455 
ROA 0.051 0.023 0.050 0.080 0.070 
RECORR 0.037 -0.330 0.054 0.413 0.515 
ROESTD 0.152 0.041 0.076 0.144 0.311 
LNASSET 5.972 5.062 5.890 6.780 1.315 
LNBM 0.690 0.326 0.517 0.815 0.660 
LEVERAGE 0.237 0.130 0.229 0.328 0.146 
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TABLE 2 
Country-Level Descriptive Statistics (Country Means) 
Country n Coverage DACC DISREQ SEC INVPRO OSRIGHT CUL 
Argentina 31 5.629 0.033 0.500 89.000 17.370 4.000 -40.000 
Australia 409 7.224 0.055 0.750 -3.000 28.520 4.000 39.000 
Austria 75 6.307 0.047 0.250 26.000 28.070 2.000 -15.000 
Belgium 47 7.128 0.049 0.420 84.000 28.320 0.000 -19.000 
Canada 317 6.508 0.057 0.920 7.000 29.250 4.000 32.000 
Chile 71 4.000 0.043 0.580 126.000 19.570 3.000 -63.000 
Denmark 205 7.805 0.050 0.580 -33.000 30.000 3.000 51.000 
Finland 80 8.688 0.049 0.500 29.000 30.000 2.000 4.000 
France 252 10.476 0.043 0.750 83.000 26.03 2.000 -15.000 
India 136 8.471 0.063 0.920 69.000 16.750 2.000 8.000 
Indonesia 143 8.430 0.080 0.500 112.000 8.630 2.000 -34.000 
Italy 38 13.803 0.052 0.670 49.000 21.210 0.000 1.000 
Japan 262 6.716 0.026 0.750 100.000 27.500 3.000 -46.000 
Malaysia 325 11.285 0.062 0.920 114.000 23.160 3.000 -10.000 
Netherland 162 14.333 0.048 0.500 11.000 30.000 2.000 27.000 
New Zealand 96 4.823 0.056 0.670 -8.000 30.000 4.000 30.000 
Norway 142 7.377 0.062 0.580 12.000 30.000 3.000 19.000 
Pakistan 21 2.333 0.068 0.580 111.000 11.010 4.000 -56.000 
Philippines 62 6.758 0.062 0.830 106.000 10.400 4.000 -12.000 
Portugal 24 5.313 0.049 0.420 140.000 21.560 2.000 -77.000 
Singapore 253 9.462 0.062 1.000 62.000 26.790 3.000 12.000 
South Africa 169 5.382 0.056 0.830 33.000 19.340 4.000 16.000 
South Korea 56 7.786 0.061 0.750 127.000 16.650 2.000 -67.000 
Spain 122 12.066 0.052 0.500 92.000 21.430 2.000 -35.000 
Switzerland 179 7.705 0.043 0.670 24.000 30.000 1.000 10.000 
Sweden 185 6.319 0.053 0.580 -11.000 30.000 2.000 42.000 
Thailand 96 6.833 0.073 0.920 108.000 14.680 3.000 -44.000 
U.K. 560 6.219 0.050 0.830 -19.000 27.670 4.000 54.000 
U.S. 868 6.900 0.050 1.000 -5.000 28.630 5.000 45.000 
Average  7.658 0.054 0.678 56.379 23.536 2.724 -4.931 
 
*Please refer to Panel A of Table 1 for variable definitions.     
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix – separately for the 1st stage (Panel A) and 2nd stage (Panel B) regressions 
 
Panel A: The Coverage Regression 
 DISREQ SEC LNSIZE LOSS ISSUE ROA RECORR ROESTD 
COVERAGE -0.0892 0.1262 0.5229 -0.0940 0.0380 0.1093 -0.0283 0.0054 
DISREQ  -0.1073 0.0064 -.0765 -0.0106 0.0700 0.0618 -0.1317 
SEC   0.0244 0.0298 -0.0062 -0.0404 -0.0016 0.0069 
LNSIZE    -0.2191 -0.0114 0.1869 -0.0586 -0.0160 
LOSS     0.0090 -0.5807 -0.0603 0.0859 
ISSUE      -0.0272 0.0300 -0.0020 
ROA       0.0907 0.0040 
RECORR         0.0295 
 
Panel B:  The Dacc Regression 
 COVERAGE INVPRO ANTIDIR CUL LNASSET LNBM LEVERAGE ISSUE 
DACC -0.0162 -0.0901 -0.0111 0.0042 -0.1415 -0.0731 -0.0759 0.0867 
COVERAGE  -0.0202 -0.2029 -0.0886 0.4551 -0.2245 0.0111 0.0380 
INVPRO   0.1917 0.6016 0.0180 -0.1240 -0.1121 -0.0392 
ANTIDIR    0.5398 -0.1022 -0.1071 -0.0414 0.0216 
CUL     -0.2097 -0.1921 -0.1672 0.0112 
LNASSET      0.0021 0.3117 0.0072 
LNBM       0.1787 -0.0343 
LEVERAGE        0.1608 
 
 
* Correlations are significant at p<0.05 or above (two-tailed) unless italicized.
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Table 4 
Regression Results (n = 5,572) 
 2SLS Model 3SLS Model 
 1st Stage Model 2nd Stage Model 1st Stage Model 2nd Stage Model 
DISREQ -3.7133 
(-10.54)*** 
 -3.7619 
(-10.72)*** 
 
SEC 0.0139 
(10.73)*** 
 0.0138 
(10.71)*** 
 
LNSIZE 2.3497 
(49.55)*** 
 2.3528 
(49.77)*** 
 
LOSS 1.1685 
(4.34)*** 
 1.0657 
(3.98)*** 
 
ISSUE 0.2174 
(1.60) 
 0.2169 
(1.60) 
 
ROA 4.1334 
(3.74)*** 
 3.8874 
(3.53)*** 
 
RECORR 0.0611 
(0.50) 
 0.0648 
(0.54) 
 
ROESTD 0.3873 
(1.91)* 
 0.3018 
(1.50) 
 
COVERAGE  -0.0007 
(-1.51) 
 -0.0012 
(-2.62)*** 
INVPRO  -0.0013 
(-6.68)*** 
 -0.0013 
(-6.35)*** 
OSRIGHT  -0.0033 
(-3.34)*** 
 -0.0029 
(-2.96)*** 
CUL  0.0001 
(2.73)*** 
 0.0001 
(2.73)*** 
LNASSET  -0.0028 
(-2.26)** 
 -0.0019 
(-1.53) 
LNBM  -.00064 
(-5.27)*** 
 -.00073 
(-6.09)*** 
LEVERAGE  -0.0196 
(-3.33)*** 
 -0.0207 
(-3.53)*** 
ISSUE  0.0103 
(6.50)*** 
 0.0104 
(6.60)*** 
ROA  0.0228 
(1.99)** 
 0.0260 
(2.27)** 
Intercept -4.1285 
(-4.43)*** 
0.0889 
(7.84)*** 
-4.0709 
(-4.38)*** 
0.0829 
(7.34)*** 
Adj. R-sq. 0.4062 0.0624 0.4062 0.0544 
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Table 5 
Regression Results (n = 5,572) 
 2SLS Model 3SLS Model 
 1st Stage Model 2nd Stage Model 1st Stage Model 2nd Stage Model 
DISREQ -2.5580 
(-7.11)*** 
 -3.7449 
(-10.67)*** 
 
SEC 0.0128 
(9.34)*** 
 0.0139 
(10.76)*** 
 
LNSIZE 2.2274 
(9.34)*** 
 2.3501 
(49.71)*** 
 
LOSS 0.7460 
(9.34)*** 
 1.0670 
(3.99)*** 
 
ISSUE 0.5794 
(3.95)*** 
 0.2170 
(1.60) 
 
ROA 3.7020 
(3.12)*** 
 3.8983 
(3.54)*** 
 
RECORR 0.0632 
(0.48) 
 0.0643 
(0.53) 
 
ROESTD -0.0215 
(-0.10) 
 0.3190 
(1.59) 
 
COVERAGE  -0.0399 
(-3.32)*** 
 -0.0292 
(-2.44)** 
INVPRO  -0.0112 
(-3.72)*** 
 -0.0083 
(-2.77)*** 
OSRIGHT  -0.0245 
(-3.56)*** 
 -0.0182 
(-2.66)*** 
CUL  0.0015 
(3.67)*** 
 0.0010 
(2.66)*** 
COVERAGE 
× INVPRO 
 0.0013 
(3.33)*** 
 0.0009 
(2.38)** 
COVERAGE 
× OSRIGHT 
 0.0026 
(3.27)*** 
 0.0019 
(2.33)** 
COVERAGE 
× CUL 
 -0.0002 
(-3.52)*** 
 -0.0001 
(-2.56)*** 
LNASSET  -0.0012 
(-0.95) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.19) 
LNBM  -.00079 
(-5.53)*** 
 -.00087 
(-6.16)*** 
LEVERAGE  -0.0142 
(-2.21)** 
 -0.0177 
(-2.78)*** 
ISSUE  0.0118 
(6.30)*** 
 0.0115 
(6.18)*** 
ROA  0.0458 
(3.07)*** 
 0.0435 
(2.92)*** 
Intercept -3.6798 
(-8.74)*** 
0.3884 
(4.22)*** 
-4.0764 
(-4.39)*** 
0.2948 
(3.22)*** 
Adj. R-sq. 0.4029 0.0644 0.4029 0.0644 
 
 
